

Market Quality, Financial Crises, and TFP Growth in the US: 1840 – 2014

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
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The views expressed in these presentation are our own, and do not necessarily represent those of any institution with which we are associated.

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Two puzzles in search of an explanation


US Financial Crises



Crisis Date Series: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Major Banking Crises dropping those related to wars (1861, 1864, 1914)

US TFP Growth

TFP Growth




Source: Fernald (2012, updated), San Francisco Fed


Our hypothesis

- All firms maximize long-run value; but...
- To get to the long-run, firms must first survive the short-run;
- When market quality is poor (operationally: when market opacity is high), firms need to signal their quality and do so by pursuing **Flash** strategies that deliver immediate returns;
 - Management neglects longer term risks and opportunities, leading to higher crisis risk and lower Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth
- When market quality is high, firms do not need to signal their quality to the same extent and so can pursue **Substance** strategies (lower crisis risk, higher TFP growth);
- So, as market quality declines, crisis risk goes up and TFP growth goes down.

Market Quality Over Time




Credit booms, market quality, and crises



Credit Data: Jorda, Schularick and Taylor Macrohistory Database

Market Quality and TFP Growth

TFP Growth



TFP Data: John Fernald's webpage at the San Francisco Fed

Organization

- Derive: i) the relationship between market quality and economy performance; and ii) an empirical measure of market quality;
- Estimate this measure;
- Explore the relationship between market quality and crisis risk;
- Explore the relationship between market quality and TFP growth;
- Caveats
- Conclusion

The Relationship Between Market Quality, TFP Growth, and Financial Stability

The Motivating Idea: No Firm Is An Island

- To be successful in the long-run, a firm needs to attract firm specific investments from outside parties in the short-run;
 - It could be specific human capital investments from employees, and/or firm specific consumption investments by customers (Android or Apple?), and/or firm specific investments by suppliers;
- Outsiders want to be sure that these firm specific investments will be worthwhile;
- So, they only make these investments if they think the firm has a Good project;
- To maximize long-term value, firms therefore have to **signal** that they have a good project in the short-run (that the firm is a Good type);


The Firm's Choice: Flash or Substance?

- Each firm generates 1 signal when it is created, and must then choose between a **Flash** approach and a **Substance** approach;
 - Flash: Management focuses upon producing immediate results (in model terms: more signals of project type) while ignoring longer term consequences (more risk, fewer fundamental innovations).
 - Substance: Management focuses upon project value assuming it clears the short-run hurdle, so fewer signals of project type but less long term risk and more fundamental innovation;
 - We assume that the Flash strategy involves an extra effort cost by management, so all else equal firms choose the Substance approach;
- All firms choose the approach that maximizes the PDV of future profit (so, people are not idiots);

Market Quality

- We summarize market quality by the opacity parameter Θ ;
 - Θ = the probability that a signal **incorrectly** reveals the firm's type;
 - $0 \leq \Theta \leq 1/2$
 - $\Theta = 0$: Markets are perfectly transparent
 - $\Theta = 1/2$: Markets are perfectly opaque (signals are random);

Market Quality, Expected Firm Value, and Firm Approach




Market Quality And the Flash/Substance Choice

- When markets are perfectly transparent, firms do not need to signal, so firms choose the Substance approach;
- When markets are totally opaque, signaling has no effect;
- When markets are partially opaque, the extra signal the Flash strategy produces is valuable;
- So, assuming that opacity is below a critical level Θ^* , the proportion of firms that follow a Flash strategy increases as market quality decreases.

Implications

- As market opacity increases, firms are more likely to pursue Flash strategies;
- As more firms pursue Flash strategies,
 - The risk of a crisis increases;
 - Productivity growth falls.

Our Measure of Opacity: The Standard Deviation of Idiosyncratic Firm Returns



Measuring Opacity

- When markets are opaque, a Good signal increases firm value (by making it more likely that outside parties will make the firm specific investment) and a Bad signal decreases firm value;
- As signals become more important, the impact on firm value increases:
 - Implication: The Standard Deviation of Firm Returns Increases
 - The Flash approach involves more signals and so an even higher Standard Deviation of returns;
- So, as Opacity increases, the sigma increases for all firms and firms shift from lower sigma Substance approaches to higher sigma Flash approaches;
- Our Measure of Opacity: The standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm returns;

Measuring Market Quality

⊕: Our proposed measure

⊕ = The standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm returns (σ) net of transitory market effects

The standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm returns

- A firm's idiosyncratic return equals its return net of the median return of comparable firms to eliminate any impact from industry/market shocks;
 - Comparable firms: Same 3 digit SIC code, same size decile, some combination of size and industry;
 - We use monthly returns;

Transitory market effects

- Market wide volatility
 - Control: the St. Dev. of the market index return over the past year;
- Market upswings and downswings
 - Control: Market Return
- Time series effects
 - We use a Garch (1,1), AR 3 specification


Possible factors affecting Θ

- The SEC reforms of 1934:
 - The SEC was created in 1934 with the express aim of reducing market opacity;
 - The SEC reforms built upon and extended post-crash reform efforts begun by the NYSE;
 - We can see if these reforms mattered.

Data

- Sample: NYSE listed firms, monthly returns;
 - 1840 – 1925: Old New York Stock Exchange Project, Yale School of Management
 - 1926 – 2016: CRSP
- Why the US?
 - We have a long Pre- and Post-Regulation series;
 - With 177 years of data we have enough crises to do some exploratory empirical work;
 - We do not have to figure out how to control for country differences;

The evolution of σ : Time dummies Alone




A. No Long Term Trend

B. The SEC Reforms Mattered


The evolution of Θ and the SEC

- We can model the evolution of σ parsimoniously by replacing all the time dummies with an SEC effect:
 - $\text{LogSECTime} = \text{Log}[1 + \text{Years Since 1935}]$; and
 - SECTime: Years Since 1935
 - We cap the Years at 65 as the SEC regime has then reached its terminal state;

The evolution of Θ



Fundamental Opacity (Subtracting Out Market and Time Series Effects)



The evolution of Θ and market performance


- Our model implies that changes in market quality will have a profound impact upon overall economic performance by changing optimal strategies;
- We have a significant amount of variation in market quality over our sample period;
- So, let's see what happens.

Credit Booms Don't Cause Crises, People Cause Crises

Our hypothesis

- The current view: Financial crises occur when a credit boom goes bad;
 - Schularick and Taylor (2012)
- Our take: Credit booms increase crisis risk only when firms pursue Flash strategies;
- Test:
 - Does the probability of a crisis depend upon Θ ?

Credit booms, market quality, and crises: Non-Parametric Test



Credit Data: Jorda, Schularick and Taylor Macrohistory Database

Crisis Probability and Market Quality: Non-Parametric Test

- In times of poor market quality (1840 to 1935, 1996 to 2016), the probability of a crisis is: 7% per year;
 - 115 Years, 8 Major Crises
- If the Probability of a Crisis remained at 7% during the 1945 to 1995 period of high market quality, then the probability of **not** observing a major crisis between 1945 and 2006 equals 1.2%;
 - If we have returned to a high crisis probability era, then the probability of observing at least one crisis between 1996 and 2016 is: 76%
- Conclusion:
 - The probability of a crisis does decrease as market quality increases;
 - We are back in a high crisis probability regime.

Crisis Probability and Market Quality: Parametric Analysis

- Estimate the probability of a crisis using a logit as a function of credit booms and opacity:
 - $\text{Prob}[\text{Crisis}] = -9.19 + (62.8 \times \text{Credit Growth}) + (76.4 \times \text{Opacity})$
 - Credit Growth has the right sign, but it is not statistically significant ($t = 1.27$);
 - Opacity has the right sign, but is also (barely) not significant ($t = 1.54$)'
 - Of course, we have a very small sample!
- Estimate the probability of a crisis as a function credit booms/high market quality interaction
 - Create Low Market Quality Dummy = 0 for 1935 to 1995, 1 Otherwise;
 - Credit Boom/Market Quality = Credit Growth x Low Market Quality
 - $\text{Prob}[\text{Crisis}] = -4.0 + (100 \times \text{Credit Boom/Market Quality})$
 - Interaction highly significant ($t = 5.27$)
 - $R^2 = 13\%$
- Conclusion: Credit booms on there own don't increase crisis risk, credit booms in poor quality market increase crisis risk.


Implications: MacroPru or MacroConduct?

- Credit booms are fantastic;
- Instead of trying to reduce crisis risk by stomping on credit booms, it would be better to reduce crisis risk by improving market quality.

The Decline in US TFP Growth: No Wave or No Surfing?

US TFP Growth

TFP Growth



Source: Fernald (2012, updated), San Francisco Fed

TFP Growth



Corporations ride a wave of technological change to create improved products and processes

Robert Gordon's Explanation for the Decline in TFP Growth



Gordon's Explanation: No Wave

- In a series of influential papers, Robert Gordon argues that US economic growth is basically over;
 - TFP growth has been due to three never to be repeated industrial revolutions;
 - As the reverberations of those revolutions fade away, TFP growth will basically stop;
 - Evidence: TFP growth has been falling, and no-one has a better story
 - Gordon (2012 and 2014): Free from the NBER
 - Gordon (2016), *The Rise and Fall of American Growth*: on sale now

Our Explanation for the Decline in TFP Growth



Our Explanation: Flash Over Substance

- In a high Θ world, managers will devote more effort to Flash strategies that produce immediate results (looking good now) and less effort towards Substance strategies that produce fundamental innovations;
- So, as market quality declines, TFP growth declines too;
- Unlike Gordon's conjecture, we can test this idea.

Market Quality and TFP Growth


TFP Growth

$$\text{TFP} = 5.27 - 1.6 \times \text{Credit Growth} - 61.6^* \times \text{Opacity}$$

R2: 9.6%

Actual

Predicted



A "*" indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

TFP Data: John Fernald's webpage at the San Francisco Fed

Market Quality and TFP Growth

- Opacity has a strongly negative and highly statistically significant effect upon TFP growth;
 - Credit growth does not (in the US case) have a statistically significant effect;
- The decline in market quality over the post-war period does an excellent job of explaining the path of US TFP growth;
- Our analysis suggests that the decline in US TFP growth is due to optimal firm reactions to the decline in market quality.

Caveats

Caveats

- We have a rigorous theory that leads to surprising empirical predictions, and our empirical predictions are supported by the US experience of major financial crises and TFP growth;
- That said:
 - We don't have that much data (8 crises), so we cannot control for possible alternative hypotheses;
 - We look at one country, so we can't rule out the hypothesis that what we find is some weird post-depression/post-war effect that just happened to coincide with our period of High Market Quality;
- Our analysis is not wrong (at least not yet), but we need to test the robustness of our results by expanding the analysis;

MacroConduct Policy

Macro-Conduct Policy

- The financial market quality plays a central role in determining the overall level of economic performance (stability and growth);
- Financial regulation can play a key role in bringing about financial markets that work well;
- **MacroConduct Policy:** Strategically regulating financial markets so as to get them to work well;
 - There is no (or, at least, *there does not need not to be*) a growth/stability trade-off;
 - MacroConduct policy can reduce the immediate risk to financial stability (crisis risk) and also the long-run risk to financial stability produced by low growth;

Next steps

- Find a cure
 - Expand the analysis to be sure that we are on the right track;
 - Assuming that our diagnosis of the problem holds up...
 - We need to find methods/policies that can replicate the beneficial impact of the SEC for markets as they are now;

We don't need a new Glass-Steagall, we
need a new SEC

No pressure, but 1 or 2 more crises and...

