#### **Basel Committee on Banking Supervision**



BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

# Towards a safer and more stable financial system

7 July 2014, Systemic Risk Centre, London, UK

Stefan Ingves Chairman, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Governor, Sveriges Riksbank




### Agenda


- **1**. Why Basel III?
- 2. Key accomplishments
- 3. Remaining work

## The financial crisis - a collapse in confidence in the banking system

CDS-premia, 5 year USD senior unsecured for a selection of international banks, basis points




#### Financial crisis are costly – the Swedish case




Basel Committee on Banking Supervision


### Key accomplishments - more and better quality capital a first step to rebuild confidence



### Leverage ratio: backstop to the risk-weighted capital requirement



#### Gone-concern loss absorbing capacity (GLAC)



#### Basel III sets quantitative requirements on liquidity


Short term liquidity

Long term funding

Liquidity Coverage Ratio	<b>Net Stable Funding Ratio</b> To be finalized by end-2014
High quality liquid assets $\ge 100 \%$	Available stable funding
Net cash outflows over a 30 day period	Required stable funding $\geq 100 \%$

#### Three additional measures complement the risk-based ratio

Swedish banks' progress towards the new regulatory requirements, Q1 2011 - Q4 2012



Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Supervision Supervision buffers. Note: the indicated positions in the diagram shows the average Basel III ratios for the major Swedish banks. Sweden currently has a higher requirement for CET1 at 12%. The Basel CET1 requirement is 9.5%, which includes the countercyclical and capital conservation buffers.

Restricted

#### Strengthened supervisory frameworks


- Core principles for effective banking supervision revised in 2012 to incorporate lessons from the crisis.
  - Highlighted the need for greater supervisory intensity, and the importance of taking pre-emptive actions to address systemic risk.
- Guidance has also been published on
  - Data aggregation principles
  - Supervisory colleges
  - Dealing with weak banks
  - Sound capital planning
  - External and internal audits of banks

#### Key regulations in place, but the job is not done!

- The Basel III package and related reforms address the shortcomings that led to the crises
- But key reforms remain to be finalised
  - Net stable funding ratio
  - Revisions to the securitisations framework
  - Issues related to gone-concern loss absorbing capital (GLAC)

#### > Also regulation only works if consistently implemented

 Unacceptably large variations (ie not explained by risk taking) in the calculation of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA), both across a global sample and within the same country. An illustrative example of the outcome of risk-weighted asset variability



Lack of comparability undermines credibility of capital ratios and hampers recovery of the sector

#### Implementation is key!

- 1. Timely adoption of Basel III
- 2. Consistency of national regulations with the Basel III text
- 3. Delivery of comparable outcomes (focus on RWA)

#### RCAP assessments reduce variability in national regulations



#### Review of the overall framework

- BCBS plans to assess the capital framework and its effectiveness against the objectives we have set.
- Long term project which the BCSB should do periodically, particularly as implementation matures and banks and markets evolve.

#### Concluding remarks

• Basel III has targeted the key weaknesses identified by the crisis

- Quality and level of capital
- Unstable funding profiles
- Weaknesses in risk management and supervision
- Inconsistent global implementation
- We need to finish the job
  - Finalise outstanding regulatory reforms
  - Continue the implementation monitoring
  - Address the problem of unwarranted RWA variability