A fixed point theorem for measurable selection valued correspondences induced by upper Caratheodory correspondences
Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications, 25, 2
Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
Dynamic Games and Applications, 13, 636–668
Discounted Stochastic Games, the 3M Property and Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria
We show that all discounted stochastic games DSGs satisfying the usual assumptions have Nash payoff selection correspondences having fixed points. Our...
DP 119
Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
An important aspect of network dynamics that has been missing from our understanding of network dynamics in various applied settings is the influence...
DP 117
Parameterized State-Contingent Games, 3M Minimal Nash Correspondences, and Connectedness
Under mild assumptions on primitives, we show that all parameterized state-contingent games (PSGs) have upper Caratheodory (uC) Nash (equilibrium)...
DP 116
A Fixed Point Theorem for Measurable Selection Valued Correspondences Induced by Upper Caratheodory Correspondences
We show that any measurable selection valued correspondence induced by the composition of an m-tuple of real-valued Caratheodory functions with an...
DP 115
